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In this paper, I posit that our minds inevitably internalize the external in the process of metaphysical 
enquiry because they naturally rely on abstraction, categorization, simplification and association. I first 
focus on the idea of substratum by claiming that it cannot exist independently of our minds. Second, I 
opine that both primary and secondary qualities are significantly dependent on our minds. Last but not 
least, I extend the shadow of relativity over the notion of motion. Finally, I postulate that even though 
there is certain external reality upon which our enquiry can converge, the external world is neither 





John Locke opined that a certain set of qualities is always attached to a core that holds 
these together. This Lockean substratum is described as something non–extended, for 
extension itself is a property. Even though I hold that the principle of substratum is 
incompatible with the basic framework of dualism to which Locke adhered, I must 
credit Locke’s brilliant mind for posing one of the most fundamental questions that 
metaphysicians have ever come to entertain – can we conceive of substances 
independently of their qualities? I believe that the search for an answer to this 
conundrum may help us uncover the truth about certain basic principles upon which the 
human mind operates. This will in turn enable us to draw reasoned conclusions in the 
epistemic discussion of the relation of the internal, i. e. our minds, and the external.  
 
Locke saw extended objects as a set of qualities held together by a substratum. For the 
sake of clarity, let us consider such a mundane object as a table. This table would have 
certain size and shape, these qualities would in turn result in certain color, smell or even 
taste. In the Lockean framework, all of the aforementioned qualities would then be held 
together by their core substratum. The key difficulty is encountered when we pay closer 
attention to the actual definition of specific objects and their parts. It is utterly 
unreasonable to deny that the table itself can be the subject of our discussion, but the 
same truth applies to its legs. Taking this thought to its deliberate conclusion, we must 
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posit that the legs are not the only parts of the table but that we can also identify 
specific parts of the legs which could undeniably be labeled as fairly independent 
objects. Along the same logic, the table itself once used to be part of a tree. Two self–
evident conclusions can be drawn from this demonstration. First, most objects evolved 
from, and will evolve into, other objects for there is a wide consensus regarding the 
tenet that matter cannot be simply annihilated or created ex nihilo. Rather, matter is 
subject to continuous transformation. Second, an infinite number of objects can be 
identified within an object. This is necessarily true, because each of these can be 
assigned certain qualities. 
 
Several questions arise from these conclusions. First, when does a newly created object 
receive its own substratum? Similarly, does the table, which has its own substratum, 
contain also many other substrata for the identifiable parts of this table? Let me make 
the implications of the substratum tenet even more lucid before I proceed to answering 
these concerns.  
 
It is fairly obvious that we can describe an infinite number of objects that form what we 
refer to as the external world. Whenever we encounter a part of this world, it can be 
described with more or less precision. That would not only mean that there is an infinite 
number of substrata, it would also entail that certain substrata would be overlapping 
their “scope of authority.”  Furthermore, this conclusion seems to be hard to reconcile 
with the basic dualist framework of passive bodies and minds as “thinking things.” Let 
the reader be reminded that non–extendedness is a quality that the dualists have 
consistently ascribed to minds, which are in this respect incomparable to the external 
extension, for non–extendedness cannot be extended and, similarly, whatever is 
extended cannot be characterized by non-extendedness. Accordingly, asserting that 
substrata have no extension brings them unprecedently close to the concept of mind. 
One fairly obvious solution is capable of withstanding the scrutiny of the forepresented 
analysis by turning its weak points into an advantage. It is the Cartesian notion that the 
universe is a plenum – the whole cosmos – rather than individual substances. Yet, let us 
postpone the discussion of this idea by several passages for it has its proper place in the 
metaphysical framework that I labor to embed. 
 
Instead of looking for numerous and somewhat external substrata, I could entertain the 
idea that primary qualities are the very essence of the external world and that the size of 
a certain extension appears to be the extension itself. Yet, my position is closer to that 
that our minds decide, or at least significantly participate in the process of deciding, 
what is a whole and what is a part and then bundle the appurtenant properties together. 
Even though I recognize that this statement is unprecedently provocative and daring, I 
am of the opinion that I have set on the path that will lead me to a more complete 
understanding.  
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Let me now elaborate on the notion that the universe can be conceived of as a plenum 
rather than a set of individual, divisible, and clearly definable objects. I will first focus 
on the Cartesian definition of matter as an extended substance. In his Principles of 
Philosophy, René Descartes posits that a key difference between minds and matter is 
that bodies are extended. This brings us to the very definition of matter. One may ask 
whether space, seemingly empty, is different from matter. Descartes clarifies this by 
asserting that “after taking from a certain space the body which occupied it, we do not 
suppose that we have at the same time removed the extension of the space, because it 
appears to us that the same extension remains there so long as it is of the same 
magnitude and figure” ( Descartes ). As has been mentioned above,  Cartesian thinkers 
held that the essence of matter is extension. It follows that whatever is extended must 
be considered matter, whether this matter is composed of what we usually refer to as 
bodies or simply space. Since the external world is not a mind but an extended 
substance, it then follows that the external world is extension. If all of the external 
world itself is extension, then it also is matter. Hence, it must be a perfect and 
continuous plenum.  
 
Rather than succumbing to the notion that matter can be divided into parts, I must 
suggest that matter as it occurs to us seems to be diversified so that we err in believing 
that distinguishability equals divisibility. We are further led to posit that this 
distinguishability is enabled by secondary qualities of the same continuous and 
inherently indivisible plenum. The Cartesian thinkers had correctly observed that 
secondary qualities, often represented by color, sound or taste, are to a great degree 
dependent on the observer himself and that they, along the same reasoning, can be 
separated from the external objects themselves. Yet, the more I entertain this notion, the 
more I am drawn to the conclusion that we find it hard to distinguish primary and 
secondary qualities purely by sensory perception. It seems to me that whatever we may 
see in this world is not only extended, but also endowed with certain color. 
Furthermore, the color itself seems to be extended over the whole extension or, in other 
words, the extendedness of any extension appears to be enabled by the secondary 
quality of color. Even though the notion of separability of the secondary quality of 
color did not withstand the test of mere perception, it may still be immune to our doubt 
as long as our reasoning will lead in a different direction. Yet I find it equally, if not 
more, difficult to even conceive of extension without any particular relationship to my 
visual experience. I repeatedly attempt to conceive of crystal clear extension, only to 
realize that this effort is a mere mask for my proclivity to link extension with more or 
less sharp visual perception. The reader may pose the question whether I am claiming 
that a man born blind cannot conceptualize extension. In order to answer this concern, I 
must bring the reader’s attention to the famous Molyneux problem. The fact that a man 
born blind is not able to link two distinct perceptions of extension further evidences that 
the complete notion of extendedness, as it is present in our intellect, is formed by our 
minds from complementary sensations.   
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I must now ask myself: Does the fact that I am troubled by the tenet of separability 
mean that I am to abandon the principle of primary and secondary qualities? This I 
resist to do because the reasoning that led me to assume that distinguishability does not 
equal divisibility and that cosmos is a plenum still seems to stand. Therefore, I must 
conclude that primary qualities are truly accessible only with the necessary assistance 
of secondary qualities. Even though it seems that these two categories can theoretically 
be separated, the more we delve into the subject, the more we realize that such a project 
can hardly be completed and the more we understand that the true nature of the primary 
quality of size is not significantly more accessible than that of the secondary quality of 
color.  
 
Let us now examine the primary quality of motion for it seems that the skepticism 
developed in the recent meditation cannot be upheld against something so obvious as 
motion. We should not expect the tenet of the universe as a plenum to cause particular 
confusion in this domain since it not only allows but also calls for motion, albeit 
circular. I recall countless experiences in which I clearly observed that certain objects, 
or shall we call them parts of the plenum, were changing their position and relation 
with respect to one another. I continuously comprehend that what my sight perceives 
today is utterly different from what it grasped last week and I have no doubt that it will 
be clearly distinguishable from what I may find around me tomorrow. So far the notion 
that motion must exist seems to be very durable, which is considerably dissimilar to 
other long–held beliefs that have been scattered in the course of this meditation. It 
seems inevitable that motion must exist, but we may find it more troubling to ascertain 
the various relations of motion, i. e. to determine what stands and what moves, in which 
direction or with which speed such motion takes place. We have made it clear that the 
changing surroundings of myself do indeed necessitate some change, which we choose 
to call motion, to take place. Ultimately, it appears to be a lot harder task to learn 
whether such change results from one object lying idle and another moving or whether 
both considered objects move in the same direction, but the slower pace of the first 
causes the increasing distance from the second. Having suggested this relativity, I now 
recall moments in which I kept starring at a high tower, believing that the passing 
clouds are static and that it is the building that changes its location. I now recall my 
knowledge of physics which taught me that the Earth is moving through the universe 
with an impressive speed and that the entire solar system as well as our galaxy are 
spining through the darkness of the unknown which seems to be somewhat hard to 
reconcile with the immediate fact that I am sitting in this peaceful classroom in the 
middle of the night, completely ignorant of the velocity with which I myself am 
spinning through the universe.  
 
Despite the unsettling results of this meditation, I am not ready to give up the notion 
that I may know something of this world since I have been able to navigate through life 
with substantial success. My experience with my existence has been remarkably 
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consistent and my communication with others has repeatedly assured me that at least 
some parts of this world are understood similarly and enjoy fairly universal assent. The 
very fact that I have undertaken this meditation convinces me of one notion that may 
provide us with at least partially satisfying conclusion. I now realize that the key task of 
the human mind is to make sense of the environment in which we happen to find 
ourselves. We constantly strive to draw conclusions and find definite answers for life 
without doing so would truly be unbearable. I now realize that the true and fundamental 
task of my mind is to synthesize the various perceptual inputs it is provided with in 
order to give me a more or less precise picture of whatever is located outside of my 
own existence so that I can survive. I now come to understand that my senses do not 
only provide me with individual perceptions but furthermore, they work on a 
complementary basis that enables my mind to construct a comprehensive and wholistic 
picture. Let us once again consider the example of a table, a piece of wood. I realize 
that the idea of the object as I possess it does not only include the individual qualities of 
brown color, the perceived shape, the sound of knocking on wood or the size of the 
table. All of these taken together form the unique idea. All of these taken together are 
more that a mere sum of the individual parts. Similarly, our experience with a 
consumed meal is significantly altered when we lose the ability to smell it.  
 
This is not to suggest that the external reality is dependent on us, this is to suggest that 
we do not really have access to this external reality because all that we can encounter is 
the reality mediated by our own limits. There are four distinct methods that our minds 
employ in order to fulfill their prime task – to make at least a partial sense of the world 
around us. These are abstraction, categorization, simplification, and association. By 
means of abstraction, we attempt to get rid of seemingly unimportant details and 
particularities so that we can form some overarching understanding. To provide an 
example, we may refer back to the overarching understanding of what a table is. By 
means of abstraction, we are able to ascribe to it certain general concepts such as 
functionality. By means of categorization, we, similarly to abstraction, ignore subtle 
differences in order to fit what we observe and learn to a number of categories, which is 
inexorably smaller than the actual number of varieties. It must also be noted that we 
often categorize based on the concepts reached in the process of abstraction. Therefore, 
not rarely do we categorize anything that performs the function of a table as one, 
relying on the concept of functionality. Both abstraction and categorization are in turn 
enabled by means of simplification. And finally, rather than accepting the unbearable 
uniqueness of every little part that forms the external world, we look for concepts and 
ideas we already possess to help our understanding. Let me provide the reader with an 
instance in the concept of infinity. We have learned to use the term superfluously, with 
more or less precision. However, when we truly focus our attention on that concept, we 
find that it is hardly intelligible. We may appease our minds by imagining that an 
infinite number is simply very high, but in reality, we cannot fully grasp the concept of 
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infinity. Even though it is very abstract, it is hard to categorize, simplify, or associate 
with anything we know. 
 
I can now conclude that the external world most probably does exist, but it is neither 
perfectly nor particularly closely knowable. It can never be particularly closely 
knowable because the only way to examine the external world with sufficient 
objectivity would be to step out of our own minds. Naturally, we will never be able to 
step out of our own minds, and therefore, we only infer, albeit after a careful 
meditation, that there is certain external reality upon which our enquiry can converge. 
We will never reach that epistemic certainty because of the inevitable internalization of 
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